


























































Crisis States Programme 
Working papers series no.1 
English version: 
ISSN 1740-5807 (print) 
ISSN 1740-5815 (on-line) 




A RECONNAISANCE OF PANCHAYAT 















ISSN 1740-5823 (print) 
ISSN 1740-5831 (on-line) 
Copyright © Shaibal Gupta, 2002 
 
All rights reserved.  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or 
transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of the publisher nor be 
issued to the public or circulated in any form other than that in which it is published.  
 
Requests for permission to reproduce any part of this Working Paper should be sent to: 
The Editor, Crisis States Programme, Development Research Centre, DESTIN, LSE, Houghton Street, 
London WC2A 2AE. 
 
 1
Crisis States Programme 
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The decision of the British Council to wind up its cute library from Patna and surfacing of a 
new social composition, as revealed in the recently held Panchayat Election in Bihar, 
probably hold promise of a unique political, academic and cultural potboiler in the firmament 
of this state. If the British Council Library was the last citadel of Eurocentric world view, the 
social constellation which has emerged out of the Panchayat election, will be the final 
triumph of a Bihar-centric rural world view. The chasm between these two world views was 
being witnessed for a long time; but with the decision of the banishment of the library from 
this benighted state and further democratization and electoral empowerment through the 
recent Panchayat Election, there will now be a symbolic breach in the dialogue between these 
two world views. If this process of democratization had not occurred in this election, possibly 
Bihar could have ‘re- forged’ its link with the national polity. 
 
The Panchayat Election of 2001 was held in Bihar after a lapse of twenty-three years. Inspite 
of being Rajiv Gandhi’s pet dream and subsequently a part of the Constitutional fiet of the 
73rd.Amendment, the Panchayat Election was not held earlier either by the Congress Party, or 
later by the Janta Dal, and still later by its progeny RJD. The reluctance of the state leaders of 
the Congress was understandable. Earlier Indira Gandhi and later Rajiv Gandhi tried to forge 
direct links with the lower power centres, ignoring the regional power satraps. Indira Gandhi 
had limited this strategy within the party-fold to marginalize the ‘Syndicate’ and their 
regional counterparts by directly approaching the masses. Rajiv Gandhi had then tried to 
institutionalize it by fabricating the Panchayat Raj structure, as he had disdain and contempt 
for the regional leaders. Both Indira and Rajiv increasingly perfected the art of ‘plebiscitory’ 
politics, where party structures and regional power centres proved to be stumbling block. 
Apart from this political implication, decentralization and the accompanying devolution of 
resource to the rural areas was also expected to arrest the trend of a shrinking home market. 
With liberalization and opening of the home market, the stagnation could be circumvented by 
a buoyant rural market which could be ensured through decentralization and devolution. But 
since such decentralisation entailed weakening of state level leadership, even during the 
fragmented tenures of Jagannath Mishra or Binddeshwari Dubey or even Bhagwat Jha Azad 
as Chief Ministers of Bihar in eighties, election for the panchayats was not held. 
 
Even in the Panchayat Election of 1978 itself, held no less than twenty-three years ago, there 
was visible shift in the political centre of gravity. Karpoori Thakur, the then Chief Minister, 
had implemented the Mungeri Lall Commission Report, which entailed reservation in the 
state government jobs, for the lower backwards (Annexure I castes) and the upper backwards 
(Annexure II castes) in Bihar. After the implementation of the Report, the whole state got 
engulfed into agitation either in favour or against the reservation. This measure of Karpoori 
Thakur completely changed the political and social discourse in Bihar. The social divide that 
followed in Bihar was dramatized in the intensely fought bye-election of Samastipur 
Parliamentry seat, necessitated by the resignation of Karpoori Thakur, after his being elected 
as the Chief Minister. A greenhorn in politics, Ajit Mehta, could defeat the glamourous 
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Tarkeshwari Sinha after fierce fight. For the first time, a pan-backward upsurge could be seen 
for Ajit Mehta, which was going to script subsequent political development in Bihar.  
 
There were two immediate fall-outs of Karpoori Thakur’s measure. First, the lower 
backwards, distributed amongst 108 castes and  who constitute about 33 percent of the 
population in Bihar, were brought into the centre stage for the first time and thus they got a 
distinct identity. Secondly, most of the homogenous political formations based on ideological 
moorings, got split vertically on the basis of social divide. The spectacle of CPI was most 
unnerving. This premier Communist Party, even while fighting unsuccessfully Jay Prakash’s 
movement in seventies, never allowed its base to be eroded, nor its organization to be 
effected. Infact, during that period, the organization got strengthened and it emerged as a 
well-oiled machinery. But Karpoori Thakur’s reservation policy completely fractured its 
organisational homogeneity, from which it could never recover. 
 
Karpoori Thakur’s strategy of reservation and Panchayat Election was the stroke of a political 
genius. In the absence of full consolidation of his political support at the state level and 
possibility of legislative coup, with a powerful adversary like Satyendra Narain Sinha lurking 
around, Karpoori Thakur opted for decentralization by democratization of the polity. The mix 
of ‘Panchayat’ and ‘Mungeri Lall’ was answer to this strategy. The Communist Party of India 
(Marxist) followed this strategy of decentralization in West Bengal. Having been ousted 
several times earlier, either through legislative coup or through President’s rule, CPI(M) 
wanted to ensure substantial transfer of resources from the state level to Panchayats when 
they once again came to power in late seventies. They fe lt that in case of legislative 
destabilisation in future, they could hold on to the lower power centres. Interestingly, the 
process of decentralization was introduced both in Bihar as well as in West Bengal in 1978, 
when the Congress Party was briefly eclipsed from power in New Delhi. Even after the fall of 
the Janta Party Government in centre, the CPI(M) continued to rule in West Bengal, and the 
process of decentralization was strengthened; whereas in Bihar, it had relapsed back to the 
old power configuration. West Bengal in recent years have witnessed the highest growth in 
agricultural production and substantial reduction in rural poverty, which is being attributed to 
decentralization. Fortunately, even in the absence of decentralization, the process of 
democratization could not be stopped in Bihar. After all, the efforts of Karpoori Thakur did 
not go totally in vain. The Congress in eighties again came back to power in Bihar with the 
help of the old social and political network. However, inspite of its conservatism, it had to 
give space and take cognizance of the reality of the new social stirrings and many had to be 
co-opted into the power structure from the social justice segment from below and above. 
During the tenure of Bhagwat Jha Azad, several key portfolios and posts were given to 
Ministers and Officers from the social justice group. But these efforts remained more as a 
token rather than a substantive effort. As a result, the Congress could not build authentic 
inroads into these social groups. 
 
By the time Laloo came to power, with the dexterous social engineering in the wake of the 
Mandal Commission, the electoral empowerment of the social justice group was final and 
complete. While legislative uncertainty of Karpoori Thakur hastened the process of 
decentralization, Laloo could afford to ignore it because of his relative social and political 
stability. Class limitation of Laloo also came in the way of decentralization. Coming from the 
‘Cockney’ segment of the local elite, he could never understand that decentralization could 
develop provincial market and thus trigger development. He was politically more engaged 
about the implications of collapse of the upper caste citadel in 1990 Assembly Election in 
Bihar, rather than consolidating this gain through development. The subsequent elections of 
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1995 and 2000 in the last decade, further strengthened the social justice group, specially its 
upper segment. This put the question of ‘development’ in the backburner. Thus the political 
purpose of decentralization, like the land reform, was over for the upper backwards in Bihar. 
In case of the Panchayat Election, it was feared that the backward coalition which was built 
so assiduously over the years will be fractured at the grassroot level, specially in the absence 
of an organised and disciplined party structure. Even after the formation of Samata Party and 
the subsequent split of the Janta Dal into JD(U) and RJD, the hegemony of the social justice 
group was  not threatened at the state level. But this could not be stated with certainty at the 
grass root level in case of Panchayat Election. It was probably in the mind of the RJD leaders 
that a strategic and stable coalition was threatened to collapse, if, Yadavs, the preeminent 
caste of the social justice group, jockeys for power with the Muslims at the local centres. 
Further, with the meagre resources at the command of the state government, the 
decentralization will aggravate the financial crisis. Lastly, with the possibility of increased 
transparency, Panchayat Election was not a palatable proposition for the political managers, 
Cabinet Ministers and apex civil servants of the state. However, the Panchayat Election could 
not be avoided thanks to the intervention of the judiciary. The broad results of the election 
largely conform to the above social and political trends in Bihar since the last Panchayat 
Eections in 1978, which had gradually strengthened the hold of the upper backward castes in 
the political power structure of Bihar. The most significant result of the recent Panchayat 
Election is another round of consolidation of the political power of the now famous M-Y 
(Muslim and Yadav) combination. Though this combination appeared to be fragile at the 
Panchayat level elections, but by the time chairmanship of Zilla Parishads were being worked 
out, the magic of M-Y (Muslim & Yadav) combination started working. But along with that 
most significant and obvious trend, the recent elections have also revealed a few more 
interesting phenomena, each of which has got a clear political implications. 
 
To begin with, one should first note that the 2001 Panchayat Election will go down in the 
history of Bihar as a turning point for the electoral empowerment of the lower backwards (the 
castes listed in Annexure I). Till recently, they were not taken into political or social 
cognizance, inspite of their population being more than 33 percent of the total. With about 
108 castes in their rank, no individual segment had a overwhelming presence as is the case 
with the Yadavas. In spite of being socially and economically marginalized, they were not 
given any special attention like Dalits or other minorities. There was also no dramatic 
moment for them to forge a pan- lower-backward castes unity. The social and economic 
position of the castes in this category were not better than that of the Dalits. Infact, they felt 
very deprived for being denied discriminatory protection. Further, in the absence of a pan 
backward class movement like that in South or Western India, the possibility of any social 
mobilization exclusively for them was forestalled. Such was not the case with people from 
other backward castes.  
 
This was not the case with people from upper backward castes. While most of the anti- feudal 
movement led by Kishan Sabha before independence was successful on the economic agenda 
(like unsettlement of permanent settlement), they could not absorb the ‘social aspirations’ of 
the backward class tenants. That necessitated formation of organizations like ‘Triveni Sangh’ 
way back in the thirties, responding to the social aspirations of the upper backward castes like 
Koeri, Kurmi and Yadav. Later, this segment not only benefited socially but surged forward 
unprecedentedly in the economic front as well. Before independence, establishment of Patna 
as state capital, location of Bihar Regimental Centre at Danapur (an adjacent town of Patna), 
laying of railway line connecting the region to metropolitan centres like Calcutta, all created 
a huge market for the vegetable, milk and other food products grown in the region. Support 
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base of the ‘Triveni Sangh’ comprised the main beneficiaries of this market, which triggered 
agro-capitalism and led to substantial accumulation. Thereafter, the devastating earthquake of 
the thirties led to a sudden spurt in construction activities which in turn led to fortuitous 
conditions for ‘brick capitalism’ again utilized by the upper backwards, mostly the Kurmis 
and partly the Yadavs. In the post- independence period, with the abolition of the Zamindari 
system, large amount of ‘bakast’ land were also transferred to the upper backwards. They 
infact, along with the former Bhumihar tenants of the Zamindari system, led the ‘green 
revolution’ in Bihar. Thus the combination of ‘numbers’ and ‘accumulation’ ensured their 
electoral empowerment, which led to their independent identity. Infact, Srikrishna Sinha, the 
first Chief Minister of Bihar, could marginalize his powerful opponents like Anugraha 
Narayan Sinha by promoting and accommodating several upper backward caste leaders in the 
cabinet. Laloo’s advent by nineties signalled the final transition of political power to the 
social justice group, with the combination of ‘HYV seed and Fertiliser technology’ and 
electoral empowerment.  
 
The status of lower backward castes during all those years had, however, remained unaltered. 
While economic empowerment had touched a fraction of the upper backward castes, the large 
segments of the lower backward castes remained economically disadvantaged. Politically 
also they were marginalized. Karpoori Thakur brought them to the centre stage by 
implementing Mugeri Lall Commission, which ensured separate reservation for them. They 
also had to bear the brunt of the anti-reservation agitation along with the upper backward 
castes. During the early part of the tenure of Laloo’s Chief Ministership, he found them to be 
his  natural ally, specially during his conflict with the other segments of the upper backwards 
led by Nitish Kumar. Like Srikrishna Sinha, Laloo had also outmaneuvered his powerful 
opponents by promoting several lower backward caste leaders, like Rameshwar Rai (Amat), 
Puncham Mandal (Dhanuk), Rabindra Kumar (Tanti), Ramdev Bhandari (Keot), Ram Karan 
Pall (Gareri) and Jai Narain Nishad (Mallah). Whereas Karpoori Thakur had reserved only 10 
percent of the government jobs for them, Laloo increased it to 14 percent earlier, and after the 
vivisection of the state, to 18 percent later. Even after the rise of Karpoori Thakur or Dhanik 
Lall Mandal (former Governor of Haryana), the lower backwards did not acquire a separate 
identity. Both the above leaders were considered to be powerful leaders of the Socialist 
movement, who had given fillip to the macro backward caste movement. But it was Laloo 
who through his deft political management, converted the support of lower backward castes 
into a bedrock of social justice upsurge. Infact, they could vote freely for the first time in the 
1995 General Election, as a result of their heightened motivation as well as better security 
provided by T.N. Seshan, the then Election Commissioner of India. Over and above, during 
the last two decades, reservation resulting from Mungeri Lall Commission Report has 
ensured substantial presence of the lower backward castes in the state civil service, albeit at 
middle and lower levels. In this  Panchayat Election, however, they have decisively 
established their identity. Not only one from their own rank has emerged as a Chairman of 
the Zilla Parishad, but a large number of them have been elected either as a Mukhia (3.9%) or 
as members of Zilla Parishad (3.5%) (Table 1). This election has thus revealed that they no 
longer wants to remain as a electoral fodder of the upper backwards, and would like to be at 
the helm of different power centres.  For the first time, they have tried to forge a pan- lower-
backward alliance at different levels. Their success in the Panchayat Election is certainly not 
spectacular, but their presence in the power structure has at least become noticeable and it 
indicates a promise of new equation in the provincial politics and social alliances. 
 
A second important phenomenon to be noted from the results of the Panchayat Election is 
that, although there has been a change in the structure of power in the lower centres in favour 
 5
of upper and lower backward castes, the upper castes or the traditional elites still retain a 
substantial part of the social and political power at the grassroot level. In India, unlike in the 
higher centres, there is complete integration of economic, political and social power in the 
lower centres, that is at village or at Panchayat level. In this respect, the spectrum of Bihar is 
no different. But at higher echelon this integration has been breached substantially. It can be 
said with certainty that the social forces which are at the helm in Bihar are qua litatively 
different from anywhere in India. The ‘traditional elites’ were relegated into the background 
in Bihar long back. The ‘vernacular’ elites, who had spearheaded the ‘Green Revolution’ are 
abdicating in favour of the ‘Cockney’ elites. The emergence of the later section is result of a 
‘electoral’ rather than that of ‘economic’ empowerment. They are not wedded to Euro-centric 
model. Nor do they aspire to be the Vernacular ‘Bhadralok’. Their worldview does not extend 
beyond Panchayats and their parlance is in local dialect. Intellectually and through their class 
disposition, they are equipped to manage just the Panchayats, not anything beyond.  
 
The social support base of this elite essentially comprises those section who are either on the 
fringe of the market or outside. Unfortunately, this empowerment of the ‘Cockney elite’ is 
more electoral rather than economic. Unlike in South India where social empowerment had 
followed economic development, there is practically an economic stagnation in Bihar. 
Admittedly, upper backwards have extended their political support base in the Panchayat 
election of Bihar — Chairmanship (43%), Membership of Zilla Parishads 42% and Mukhias 
42%, but the upper castes are still holding substantial power base in rural Bihar. Their share 
in different elected post is — Chairmanship (35%) and Membership of Zilla Parishads (25%) 
and Mukhias 34% (Table 1). This integration of political and economic power could be 
possible for the upper castes in Bihar in substantial measure, because of near absence of 
economic empowerment of the social justice group in Bihar and near collapse of the state. 
This has resulted into continuation of earlier patron-client relationship, specially in the rural 
areas. Amongst the upper castes, performance of the Bhumihars is exceedingly well in 
comparison to their share in total population (Table 1). Swami Shahajanand’s enlightment 
and institutional support of Ganesh Dutt had earlier catapulted them into a most dynamic 
social group. Their highest involvement in the atrocities in the Bihar plains indicates their 
social determination and class cohesion to hold on to the power base (Table 2). Further, even 
as an agro-capitalist, they are not ready to give up their political, economic and social power. 
The present Panchayat Election clearly indicates that they have been reasonably successful in 
that effort.  
 
Besides the lower backwards castes, even the scheduled caste candidates have performed 
well in this Panchayat Election. A number of schedule castes members have got elected from 
the flaming fields of south Bihar plain, the very area where they had to face the main brunt of 
the atrocities, and quite significantly most of them had won in straight fight. Most of the 
carnages in Bihar had taken place after the last Panchayat Election (Table 2). And most of the 
atrocities were directed against the schedule caste of South Bihar plain, which is the most 
developed track of the state. Inspite of development, this area has always got convulsed with 
the peasant movement. This area also was the main bastion of the Kishan Sabha. 
Subsequently, various streams of the Communist movement had powerful base there. 
Ironically, this area is also home of the most anti-peasant armed outfit like Ranveer Sena. 
Thus most of the atrocities had taken place there, as it was very much linked with the peasant 
movement. Unlike the peasant movement in north Bihar, in south Bihar, it has not only been 
intensive but has also been prolonged. The peasant movement in south Bihar is due to a 
combination of several factors; it may be due to fallout of the capitalist transformation in 
agriculture, or due to the quagmire of stagnation and semi-feudalism. Apart from the 
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economic parameters, some attribute it to the problem of social oppression which has 
sometimes proved to be the proverbial “last straw on the camel’s back” for the rural poor. 
However, social phenomenon does not necessarily follow a unilinear track. The peasant 
movement in south Bihar could be combination of all the above factors. In reality, the  
relation between inequality and social conflict is extremely complex. Whereas one might 
expect conflict to be particularly common where inequalities are sharp and visible, they 
sometime appear in their most acute forms where inequalities are actually declining. In all 
such cases, one has to consider inequalities not only as they exist but also as they are 
perceived. Under conditions of social and economic change, a real decline in inequality may 
be accompanied by a hightened comprehension of the differences which persist. The present 
Panchayat Election has indicated the heightened awareness of the schedule castes, who have 
faced the main brunt of the atrocities, by getting elected as an independent Mukhia (Table 3). 
About 1.6 percent of the total number of Mukhias are from are scheduled castes and they all 
got elected in the direct contest. In this case they were not given the luxury of the reservation. 
Most of the schedule caste Mukhias had got elected in those districts which had experienced 
worst atrocities, like Gaya, Aurangabad, Kaimur, Jehanabad, Patna and Rohtas. In some of 
the districts of North Bihar (Darbhanga, Begusarai, Munger and Supaul), where schedule 
caste have done relatively better, were also powerful centres of the sharecroppers’ movement 
led by the Communists. 
 
The left parties generally claim that their poor results in the assembly or parliament elections 
are no indicator of their real strength; at the grassroots, they are very much present. The 
recent Panchayat Election results indicate the above assertion has some substance. Amongst 
the Hindi heartland states, Communist movement was powerful only in the state of Bihar. It 
had powerful presence in the peasant movement, as well as in the Trade Union movement. 
Whereas peasant movement was strong in the Bihar plain, the trade union movement was 
powerful in the Jharkhand region. The genesis of the Communist movement in Bihar was the 
Kishan Sabha. Earlier, while CPI had limited its discourse to economic issues, later CPI(ML) 
and other radical organizations have given sufficient thrust to the social issues. While CPI 
and CPI(M) had stagnated, CPI(ML) had surged forward dramatically in the recent period 
.With the advent of Laloo with his  slogan of social justice, Communist movement got a 
severe setback. The social base of Laloo and the left are essentially non-antagonistic. Even 
then they could not work out a viable joint strategy. The present Panchayat Election indicates 
that mainstream Communist movement is still a force to reckon with. Though this elections 
were not fought on the Party line, a closer examination would indicate that the left have got 
substantial number of seats (Table 4). Infact CPI(M), the weakest of  the Communist outfit in 
Bihar, could win the Chairmanship of Supaul Zilla Parishad; CPI missed the Chairmanship of 
Begusarai District only by a whisker; and they have won 7.1 percent of the Mukhia seats. The 
result of CPI(ML) nevertheless is surprising. They were expected to get more seats, but could 
not do so possibly because, in their strongholds in South Bihar, the battle was fierce. The 
better record of CPI and CPI(M) is also due their close proximity with the literacy movement 
which was fairly strong in many districts. Infact, in many of the districts, literacy 
functionaries have emerged as a successful candidate in the Panchayat election, possibly 
because their activities are viewed as a ‘class-neutral’.  
 




Table  1:  Percentage Distribution of Chairman, Members of Zilla Parishads and Mukhias 
by Their Caste Background 
 
Percentage of Caste/ Caste Group 
Chairmen Members  Mukhias1 
1.   Upper Caste Hindus 35.2 25.3 34.0 
      Of which       (i)    Brahmin  8.2 5.0 7.7 
                            (ii)   Bhumihar 13.5 9.1 12.1 
                            (iii)  Rajput 13.5 10.3 13.4 
                            (iv)  Kayasth — 0.9 0.8 
2.   Middle Caste Hindus 45.9 42.1 45.7 
      Of which       (a)    Annexure I castes  2.7 3.5 3.9 
                            Of which    (i)     Dhanuk  0.5 0.6 
                                               (ii)    Mallah / Gorhi  1.2 2.0 
                                               (iii)   Others2 2.7 1.8 1.3 
                            (b)    Annexure II castes 43.2 39.6 41.8 
                            Of which    (i)    Yadav 35.1 24.2 24.2 
                                               (ii)    Kurmi 2.7 4.1 5.8 
                                               (iii)   Koeri  5.2 6.3 
                                               (iv)   Bania / Vaishya 5.4 4.4 3.6 
                                               (v)    Others3   1.7 1.9 
3.   Scheduled Caste Hindus  16.9 1.06 
      Of which       (i)    Dusadh   5.6 0.7 
                            (ii)   Dhobi  0.9 0.07 
                            (iii)  Passi  1.2 0.05 
                            (iv)  Musahar  0.8 0.2 
                            (v)   Others4   8.5 0.04 
4.   Scheduled tribes   0.6 0.5 
5.   Muslims 16.2 13.0 15.6 
6.   Marwari 2.7 0.3 — 
7.   Others  0.8 2.9 
    
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
No. of Chairman/ Members 37 1160 7120 
 
Notes:  
1.  Data based on report published in ‘Prabhat Khabar’, June 27, 2001, Patna. Although 
total number of ‘Mukhias’ is 8438, this data relates to 7120 Mukhias for which caste data was 
available.  
2.  ‘Others’ include — Gangota, Barai, Lohar, Hazam, Kumhar, Bind, Suryapuri, 
Mandal, Nonia, Tharu, Cheneu etc.  
3.  ‘Others’ include — Kalwar, Halwai, Kanu, Surhi, Teli etc.  




Table  2: Distribution of Cases of Atrocities by Period, Area, Caste of Offenders  
Up to 1989 1990 to 1994 1995 to In. 2000 All Cases Characteristics 



















South Bihar 48 96.0 34 91.9 73 86.9 155 90.4 
Total 50 100.0 37 100.0 84 100.0 171 100.0 


















Rajput 13 26.0 2 50.0 0 0.0 15 8.7 
Yadav 7 14.0 2 5.0 2 2.5 11 6.4 
Kurmi 5 10.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 05 2.8 
Multi-caste 0 0.0 4 10.0 0 0.0 4 2.3 
Police 5 10.0 8 20.0 8 9.9 21 12.3 
Radical 
Organisations 
5 10.0 12 30.0 25 30.8 42 24.5 
Unreported 4 8.0 5 12.5 9 11.1 18 10.5 
Total 50 100.0 40 100.0 81 100.0 171 100.0 
 
Note:  
1.  Agrarian violence is essentially a South Bihar Plain phenomenon. 




Table  3  :  Share of Scheduled Castes in General Population and Different Layers of 
Elected Representatives in Different Districts (in Percentage)  
 
Districts S C  Population Mukhia 
Gaya  29.6 2.4 
Nawada 24.4 0 
Aurangabad 23.3 5.5 
Kaimur 21.7 5.9 
Vaishali 19.8 0 
Nalanda 19.4 0 
Jehanabad 19.4 3.7 
Lakhisarai 18.4 — 
Samastipur 18.1 1.8 
Shekhpura 18.0 0 
Jamui 17.4 1.3 
Rohtas 17.3 4.1 
Madhepura 16.3 0 
Muzaffarpur 15.7 — 
Saharsa 15.5 0 
Supaul 15.5 2.8 
Patna 15.5 3.3 
Buxar 15.2 0.7 
Darbhanga 14.6 2.7 
Khagaria 14.5 3.1 
Begusarai 14.5 3.5 
W. Champaran 14.4 1.2 
Munger 14.1 3.0 
Araria 13.7 0 
Bhojpur 13.5 2.7 
Sheohar 13.2 — 
E. Champaran 13.1 0.5 
Madhubani 12.8 0 
Purnia 12.5 0.8 
Gopalganj 12.2 0 
Sitamarhi 11.8 0.4 
Saran 11.7 0.6 
Banka 11.6 1.6 
Siwan 11.1 1.7 
Bhagalpur 9.8 0.4 
Katihar 8.8 0.8 
Kishanganj 6.6 0.8 




Table  4  :  Performance of Left Parties in Panchayat Elections. 





No. % No. % No. % No. % 
CPI — — 47 4.0 495 4.2 302 3.5 
CPI (M) 1 2.7 31 2.7 139 1.2 150 1.8 
CPI (ML) — — 20 1.7 225 1.9 133 1.8 




37 100.0 1162 100.0 11650 100.0 8438 100.0 
 
Note  : Figures in this table are based on the information provided by each Communist Party 
about its own performance. 
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